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BEYOND THE WATER COOLER: SPEECH AND
THE WORKPLACE IN AN ERA OF SOCIAL MEDIA
Ann C. McGinley* & Ryan P. McGinley-Stempel"
"In democracy it's your vote that counts; in feudalism it's your count
that votes."
-Mogens Jallberg'

I. INTRODUCTION: DEMOCRACY INTHE WORKPLACE
Few would dispute the proposition that free speech and association
play an important role in the operation of a healthy democracy. This is
particularly true in the American context,2 where an elected republic "of
the people, by the people, for the people"3 owes its foundation to a
Constitution that protects these principles. Consequently, attempts by
public officials to interfere with free speech or association have, by and
large, been deemed constitutionally infirm.s Workplaces, however, are

* William S. Boyd Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las
Vegas. J.D. University of Pennsylvania Law School, 1982. Thanks to former dean and current
provost John White, Dean Nancy Rapoport, Jeff Stempel, Jean Stemlight and Ruben Garcia for their
support. We originally presented this paper at the Democracy and the Workplace Symposium at
UNLV that was sponsored by the Saltman Center for Dispute Resolution at UNLV Boyd School of
Law. We appreciate the support of the law school, the Saltman Center, our colleagues at UNLV
and those labor law scholars who attended the symposium. Thanks also to Jeanne Price, Director of
the Weiner-Rogers Law Library at UNLV and David McClure, a library faculty member who
supported the research for this project.
** JD Candidate (expected 2013), Stanford Law School.
1. Daniel Schugurensky, Foreword to PAUL R. CARR, DOES YOUR VOTE COUNT?:
CRITICAL PEDAGOGY AND DEMOCRACY, at xvi (2011).

2. Even though American government operates as a republic, it nonetheless relies on and
subscribes to self-govemance, a fundamental tenet of democracy. See Tabatha Abu El-Haj,
Changing the People:Legal Regulationand American Democracy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 66 (2011).
3. Abraham
Lincoln,
Gettysburg Address (Nov.
19,
1863),
available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu1l9thcentury/gettyb.asp.
4. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
5. See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994) (holding city ordinance banning
residential sign stating "For Peace in the Gulf' violated the resident's right to free speech); Texas v.
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an important exception to some extent. Although the First Amendment
grants some protection to public workers to voice their views on
"matters of public concern,"6 even that protection has narrowed with
recent Supreme Court cases. Moreover, the U.S. Constitution does not
directly touch private actors, and in the employment context, this means
that few Americans enjoy protections from discharge for engaging in
speech.8 This is problematic because just as a civil society loses its
efficacy when speech is restricted, so too does democracy in the
workplace founder when employees believe that they cannot speak their
views about their work either at the office or outside of it.
The workplace occupies a more robust role in the average person's
life today than previously, and it has expanded to locations beyond the
four walls of our offices or plants. Time spent working has increased
substantially over the last several decades. 9 As a result, the relationships
developed among co-workers place a close second to those among
family members.' 0 Ironically, recent studies demonstrate that as
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding that flag burning is protected speech under the First
Amendment); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding that
public schools cannot censor speech unless facts existed at the time that could have reasonably led
school officials to forecast substantial disruption of, or material interference with, school activities).
6. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cnty., 391 U.S. 563,
563-64, 574 (1968) (holding that teacher's critical statements of the local school board and district
superintendent were protected because they spoke to school funding).
7. See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (holding that statements by public
employees made pursuant to their official duties have no First Amendment protection); City of San
Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77 (2004) (holding that the First Amendment did not protect police officer's
online selling of explicitly sexual videos because they did not deal with a matter of public concern,
and even though speech occurred outside of work, the speech was detrimental to the employer and
the employer had a right to discharge the officer because of the speech).
8. See Prysak v. R.L. Polk Co., 483 N.W.2d 629, 634 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that a
private employer was not bound by provisions in the United States and Michigan Constitutions
guaranteeing freedom of speech because neither extends to private conduct); Barr v. Kelso-Burnett
Co., 478 N.E.2d 1354, 1355 (Ill. 1985) (rejecting a public policy claim against a private sector
employer based on the First Amendment and the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the right to privacy under the Illinois
Constitution). But see Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 896, 899 (3d Cir. 1983)
(permitting a district manager to sue based on the policy of the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution and similar provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution after being discharged for his
refusal to participate in a lobbying effort in support of a bill before the state legislature).
9. See Porter Anderson, Study: US. Employees Put in Most Hours, CNN.COM (Aug. 31,
2001, 2:07 AM), http://archives.cnn.com/2001/CAREER/trends/08/30/ilo.study/; see also CYNTHIA
ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: How WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY
23 (2003).
10. See ESTLUND, supra note 9, at 24; Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The
Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 1, 3 (2000) ("[T]he workplace is the single
most important site of cooperative interaction and sociability among adult citizens outside the
family.").
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employees spend more time together than in the past, workplace
conversations have become more superficial than in earlier years."
Rafael Gely and Leonard Bierman argue, however, that conversations
enabled by modem technology allow workers to connect with one
another and with the outside world.12 Thus, workers, who now work
longer and harder than in previous years, can further develop their
workplace relationships and their relationships with others through use
of modem technology. Because the workplace, which is one of the only
locations where we encounter diverse views and lifestyles, serves as an
incubator for cooperation and civility, it encourages the "bridging ties"
that Robert Putnam argues are critical to a properly functioning civil
society.' 3 Consequently, as "working" hours increasingly fill our
"waking" hours, American civil society will depend more and more on
democratic exchanges that take place in the workplace and online. The
trend to work harder and longer hours, when paired with the exponential
rise of social media platforms (and their corresponding use),14 means
that there is vanishingly little space for free exchange of ideas that truly
falls outside the purview of the workplace.
Unions can bargain for protection from speech-related termination,
but union membership has been on a steady decline.' 5 And, every state
except Montana is an employment-at-will jurisdiction.16 Absent an

11. See Rafael Gely & Leonard Bierman, Social Isolation andAmerican Workers: Employee
Blogging andLegal Reform, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287, 289 (2007).
12. See id at302.
13. Though Putnam distinguishes between "bridging" and "bonding" associations, he still
views them both as falling under the broader category of "social capital," a term encompassing
voluntary associations, which have languished in recent times. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING
ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 19-25 (2000). Estlund makes a
persuasive argument that the workplace, precisely because it is not voluntary, better encourages the
development of "bridging ties" among co-workers of different backgrounds who might otherwise
not participate in the same activities outside of the office. See ESTLUND, supra note 9, at 125
("[T]he law's capacity to compel racial integration, together with the capacity of authorities within
the workplace to compel people to get along with each other, help to make workplace associations
distinctively important in a diverse democratic society.").
14. See Jeremy Gelms, High-Tech Harassment: Employer Liability Under Title VII for
Employee Social Media Misconduct, 87 WASH. L. REV. 249, 264-67 (2012); see also Josh Bemoff,
New 2008 Social TechnographicsData Reveals Rapid Growth in Adoption, EMPOWERED (Oct. 20,
2008), http://forrester.typepad.com/groundswell/2008/10/new-2008-social.html.
15. Union members constituted only 11.8% of the American work force in 2011. Thirtyseven percent of public workers are union members, but only 6.9% of workers in the private sector
belong to unions. See Steven Greenhouse, Union Membership Rate Fell Again in 2011, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 27, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/28/business/union-membership-rate-fell-again-in2011 .html.
16. The At-Will Presumption and Exceptions to the Rule, NAT'L CONF. OF ST.
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/labor/at-will-employment-overview.aspx (last
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individual contract or a collective bargaining agreement, state laws, state
or federal whistleblower laws, or judicially created exceptions to the
employment-at-will doctrine, there is scant protection from discharge or
other discipline based on employee speech. 17 Consequently, the vast
majority of American workers, who are employed "at-will," maintain
little job security. Moreover, even though as a nation we profess to
honor free speech as one of our most important values, in the
employment context, the law often willingly restricts employee speech
in favor of the employer's interests in efficient management." This is
not to say that employers have no legitimate interest in curtailing some
of the speech of their employees. They do have important interests to
protect. Few would debate an employer's right to maintain security with
regard to its confidential and proprietary information, intellectual
property, and information such as release dates or pending
reorganizations. 19 Most agree that employers can control employee
speech that severely or pervasively harasses other employees because of
their race, color, religion, sex, disability, national origin or age. 2 0 But
because of the employment at will doctrine, which places no restrictions
on employers' rights to discipline or fire employees, courts have
permitted employers to curtail not only employee free speech at work
but also employee behavior and speech outside of work.21
Because of the rapid advances in technology that allow employees
to voice opinions to a broader audience in different formats, speech
concerns have become even more important to employers and
employees. In an era of rapidly changing technology and new social
media sources, 22 courts have been reluctant to interpret state statutes
visited Nov. 29, 2012). The Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act of 1987 (WDEA)
created a cause of action for employees who are terminated without good cause. See MONT. CODE.
ANN. § 39-2-904 (2011) (describing the grounds for bringing a wrongful discharge claim).
17. See Ann C. McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment at Will: Toward a
CoherentNational DischargePolicy, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1443, 1491-95 (1996).
18. See Eugene Volokh, Private Employees' Speech and Political Activity: Statutory
Protection Against Employer Retaliation, 16 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 295, 306 (2012).
19. See Employee Facebook Posting Protected in Some Cases, BAKERHOSTETLER (Feb. 17,
2011),
http://www.bakerlaw.com/files/Uploads/Documents/News/Newsletters/Health%20Law/2OUpdate/
2011/3_HLU February_17.pdf.
20. See J.M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 2295, 2306
(1999).
21. See, e.g., City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77 (2004) (stating that the employer did not
violate the employee's First Amendment rights when it fired him for actions taken outside of the
workplace).
22. By social media, the authors are referring to all means used for communication over the
internet, including, but not limited to, Facebook, Twitter, etc. Social media is defined by the
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broadly or to recognize common law exceptions to the employment-atwill doctrine that would protect employee free speech rights either at
work or, if outside of work, pertaining to the workplace.23 In the context
of e-mail use, for example, courts have given employers broad authority
to discipline employees based on their speech.2 4 These cases rely either
on the employer's ownership of the e-mail system or on the employee's
voluntary use of the e-mail system to engage in speech that was
unauthorized and unrelated to work. 25 Employees, consequently, have
virtually no protection based on privacy or speech rights when the
speech takes place on the employer's e-mail system.
The phenomenon of social media has further blurred the line
between the personal and the workplace. Facebook, Twitter, and other
social media provide fora for employees to voice their opinions during
their free time outside of work, using media not owned by the
employer.2 6 The question, then, becomes whether employers have the
right to discipline employees for speech conveyed in these media even
though employees use their own access to social media systems and
express their opinions outside of work. Once again, most courts find
little or no protection for certain types of speech 2 7 and, in many cases,
employers are empowered by the public nature of these media sources to
engage in investigations of employee speech outside of work. 2 8
Employers have begun to write strict social media policies to give notice
to their employees that they are not permitted to engage in certain types
of speech about the employers on social media, even though the speech

Merriam Webster online dictionary as "forms of electronic communication (as Web sites for social
networking and microblogging) through which users create online communities to share
information, ideas, personal messages, and other content (as videos)[.]" Social Media Definition,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/social%20media (last visited
Nov. 29, 2012).
23. See, e.g., Blakey v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 751 A.2d 538, 543, 550 (N.J. 2000).
24. See, e.g., Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 101 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (granting a
motion to dismiss because the employee had no expectation of privacy to communicate
unprofessional statements to his supervisor through his employer's e-mail system).
25. See id.
26. See Michael Bologna, Illinois Becomes Second State to Limit Employer Access to Social
Media Accounts, 17 Electronic Com. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1428 (Aug. 8, 2012).
27. See, e.g., Blakey, 751 A.2d at 543 (holding that even though electronic bulletin board did
not have a physical location within the airport, it may be sufficiently work related to create an
employer's duty to remedy the harassment occurring on the bulletin board); City of San Diego v.
Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80 (2004) (holding that the First Amendment did not protect police officer's
online selling of explicitly sexual videos because they did not deal with a matter of public concern,
and even though the speech occurred outside of work, it was detrimental to the employer and the
employer had a right to discharge the officer because of the speech).
28. See Blakey, 751 A.2d at 551-52.
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takes place outside of the workplace.29 Some employers even demand
their employees' or applicants' Facebook passwords so that they can
monitor employee speech outside of work. 0 However, these employer
demands have resulted in a backlash. A number of states have banned
an employer's request that applicants or employees provide their user
name, passwords or other means of accessing personal accounts in social
media. 3 ' And, although up until very recently lawyers representing
employers have advocated for strict policies banning certain types of
speech, lawyers representing employers are now recognizing that this
may be a treacherous area for employers.32
Recently, a change has occurred that has caused considerable
controversy in the world of employment lawyers. Beginning in 2010,
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or "the Board") has taken
the position that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) protects
some employees from discipline for employee speech on social media.
And, by deeming some policies "over broad," it has in effect advised
that some employer social media policies are illegal even when
employers do not enforce the policies. 34 The Board has held that
discipline of employees for statements made about their employment on
social media may run afoul of rights provided by Section 7 of the
NLRA, which protects concerted activity. 35 These opinions, although to
29. See C. Reilly Larson, EEOC Lawyer Advises Careful Navigation of Issues in the
Workplace, BLOOMBERG BNA (Sept. 4, 2012), http://www.bna.comleeoc-lawyer-advisesn17179869380/.
30. Daniel I. Prywes, Should You Ask Job Applicants or Employees for Their Social-Media
Passwords?, 17 Electronic Com. & L. Rep. (BNA) 741 (Apr. 18, 2012).
31. See Maryland Law Bars Employer Demands for Passwords; Other States Could Follow
Suit, 10 Digital Discovery & e-Evidence (BNA) 177 (May 10, 2012) (describing the new Maryland
law that bans employers from asking for passwords and other information granting access to private
accounts of applicants and employees, and an effort by the U.S. Congress to prohibit employers
from demanding passwords and other means of access to personal accounts); Bologna, supra note
26 (discussing new Illinois law prohibiting employers from requiring applicants and employees to
share user names and passwords for individual accounts); Laura Mahoney, Californiais Latest State
to Regulate Access to Employee, Student Social Media Accounts, BLOOMBERG BNA (Oct. 1, 2012),
http://www.bna.com/califomia-latest-state-nl7179869960/ (describing new California statute
prohibiting employers from demanding passwords, etc. for individual accounts).
32.

See BRUCE BARRY, SPEECHLESS: THE EROSION OF FREE EXPRESSION IN THE AMERICAN

WORKPLACE 173-75 (2007); Larson, supra note 29; Eric Raphan & Sean Kirby, Access Denied:
Employers Should Avoid Seeking Access to Social Media Accounts, 139 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) I-1
(July 19, 2012).
33. See Steven Greenhouse, Company Accused of Firing Over Facebook Post, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 8, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/09/business/09facebook.html?_r=0.
34. See id.
35. See id. Section 7 provides that "[e]mployees shall have the right to ... engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection .... "
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some extent limited in protecting the free speech rights of employees,
apply to all employees covered by the NLRA, whether they work in a
unionized workplace or not.36 Thus, the NLRB position has the
possibility of creating significant protection to a large class of
employees, to expand employee speech rights outside of the workforce,
and to restrict employer disciplinary options when employees engage in
speech in social media. Given the importance of the potential of social
media in creating an organizational tool for employees and unions, this
protection may not only protect individual employees from discharge for
speech, but may also expand workplace democracy in two ways. First, it
may create important tools for employee communication when engaged
in union organizing efforts, and may, in a sense, counteract the problems
of access to workers created by earlier Supreme Court cases such as
Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB,37 which banned a union from campaigning on
employer property.38 Second, even absent a union organizing campaign,
social media permits employees to engage in speech on significant topics
that deal with working conditions or with politics. These relationships,
which take place outside of work, form a central part of our democracy.
Of course, because the source of this protection is the NLRA, there
will be gaps in protection of individual employee speech. The NLRA
does not necessarily protect employees' rights to engage in speech that
does not qualify as concerted and protected. 39 Nor does it protect
employees' privacy in all cases. 4 0 Thus, even employees working for
private entities who are engaged in political speech that in the public
workplace or town square would be protected by the First Amendment
will not be protected from discharge unless the speech is of the type
protected by the NLRA. This may leave a significant amount of
employee speech unprotected. In other words, employers may be able to
discipline employees for a broad range of speech occurring in social
29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006). Section 8(a)(1), in turn, makes it an "unfair labor practice" to "interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in [Section 7] ... ." 29
U.S.C. § 158 (2006).
36. See Monica F. Ramirez & Mark Simon, The NLRA's Impact on Non-Union Employers,
DALL.
BAR AsS'N,
http://www.dallasbar.org/content/nlraE2%80%99s-impact-non-unionemployers (last visited Dec. 1, 2012).
37. 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
38. See id. at 527, 529-30.
39. See Acting General Counsel Issues Second Social Media Report, NAT'L LAB. REL.
BOARD (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.nlrb.gov/news/acting-general-counsel-issues-second-socialmedia-report [hereinafter Social Media Report].
40. See Matthew W. Finkin, Information Technology and Workers' Privacy: The United
States Law, 25 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 471, 498-501 (2002) (discussing the Act's protection
against employer monitoring of protected activity).
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media without violating the NLRA. And, while the NLRB opinion is an
important tool in protecting employee speech rights, it can create
conflicts between employee rights to engage in concerted activities and
the rights of individual employees not to be harassed by co-workers or
supervisors based on characteristics such as race, gender, national origin
or religion, which are protected by federal law.4 1 Moreover, even where
there is no protection under federal law, many employers have created
general anti-harassment and anti-bullying policies that do not rely on the
protected characteristics of the individual victim. 4 2 These policies, at
times, may come into direct conflict with the NLRA protection of speech
that is considered protected, concerted activity.
This article analyzes the multitude of issues concerning employees'
use of social media outside of work and the clash between employers'
interests in maintaining effective management control and the
employees' interests in speech. Part II gives the background and
analysis of the employment-at-will doctrine and the common law (and
statutory) exceptions to the doctrine. It also discusses the potential
application of these exceptions to discharges caused by speech that takes
place on social media outlets. Part III analyzes the recent changes in
interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act, which, in some
instances, protects employee speech in social media. It discusses the
limits of the employee rights as interpreted by the NLRB and analyzes
the possible conflicts that NLRA rights may create with policies
designed to protect employees from harassment based on characteristics
protected by Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and other antidiscrimination statutes. It also discusses the potential conflicts of the
NLRA with employer anti-bullying and general anti-harassment policies.
Part IV makes recommendations about how to interpret the NLRA to
protect employee speech that furthers democracy in the workplace, and
proposes a new federal statute that protects employee speech that goes
beyond the concerted activity protected by the NLRA. The proposal
also considers the right of individuals to be protected from illegal
harassment at work and the role that employers play in this protection.
Finally, it recognizes employers' interests in maintaining efficiency,
good relations among workers, and consumer respect for their products.
This article concludes that a targeted federal statute--one that
41. See infra Part III.A.I.
42. See Erin Binney, Experts Recommend Workplace Bullying Policies, HOME CHANNEL
NEWS (Oct. 17, 2012), http://homechannelnews.com/article/experts-recommend-workplacebullying-policies.
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protects employees' interest in engaging in protected speech outside the
workplace (particularly in the context of social media) as well as
employers' duty to comply with Title VII and other anti-discrimination
statutes-offers an attractive solution because it gives employers notice
and is less vulnerable to inconsistency of the current regulatory
landscape.
II.

EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL: BACKGROUND AND LIMITATIONS ON
EMERGING EXCEPTIONS

Employment law today is "characterized by a complex system of
constitutional, statutory, administrative, and common law rights and
duties."43 But it was not always so complex. Before 1877, American
employment law followed the English common law of master and
servant, which carried a one-year presumption for any employment
contract without an explicit duration.44 In 1877, however, Horace Gray
Wood's treatise on the subject declared otherwise, effectively
establishing the employment-at-will doctrine.4 5 Under this doctrine, an
employer can terminate an employee without a contract for a fixed term
at any time, for any reason, or no reason at all. 46
A. State Statutory and Common Law Exceptions to the At- Will Doctrine
In its current form, the doctrine is less harsh than it once was,
thanks to the development of a few common-law exceptions.4 7 The
exceptions create state tort and/or contract causes of action for any
discharge that (1) contravenes public policy, (2) breaches an express or
implied contract, or (3) breaches an implied covenant of good faith and
43.
44.

1 MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 4 (4th ed. 2009).
Id. at 1; see also WILLIAM C. SPRAGUE, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ABRIDGED 74

(9th ed. 1915).
45.

HORACE GAY WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT

§

134 (1877).

Wood noted that he was aware of "no instance in which, for many years, the [English] rule has been
approved by any American court." He went on to outline the American rule:
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is primafacie a hiring at
will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to
establish it by proof. A hiring at so much a day, week, month or year, no time being
specified, is an indefinite hiring, and no presumption attaches that it was for a day even,
but only at the rate fixed for whatever time the party may serve.
Id.
46. See id.
47. For a more thorough analysis of the employment-at-will doctrine and exceptions to the
doctrine, see McGinley, supranote 17.
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fair dealing. 8 In practice, however, courts have narrowly circumscribed
these exceptions, and although most states subscribe to at least one of
these exceptions,49 very few recognize all three.so Moreover, the
protection granted to employees differs depending on the state law."
Generally, courts have held that terminations violate public policy
only when an employee is discharged for "(1) refusing to perform
unlawful acts, (2) exercising legal rights, (3) reporting illegal activity
(whistleblowing), and (4) performing public duties." 5 2 Often, this means
that a public policy must be clearly expressed in a state statute or
constitution to allow redress.53 Moreover, certain constitutional rights,
like freedom of speech, have generally not been extended to private
sector employees. 5 4
Similarly, although employment handbooks, oral promises, and
employer conduct can create implied contractual obligations, plaintiffs
who allege that their handbooks or oral promises create protection from
discharge must satisfy a number of conditions to maintain a cause of
action under this line of reasoning.55 Employment handbooks, for
instance, must have sufficiently specific language, and employers can
ordinarily disclaim any implied obligation with a clear, conspicuous, and
unequivocal statement that employment is still at-will. 6
Many states have also created statutory exceptions to the at-will
doctrine that prohibit employers from discharging employees for

48. See, e.g., Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in the UnitedStates: The Divine Right
ofEmployers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 70-72 (2000).
49. Every state except Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maine, Nebraska, New York,
and Rhode Island observes the public policy exception to the at-will rule in some fashion. Charles J.
Muhl, The Employment-at-Will Doctrine: Three Major Exceptions, MONTHLY LAB. REV. (Bureau
of Labor Statistics), Jan. 2001 at 3, 4. In addition, most states hold "that promises contained in an
employment manual may bind an employer." See, e.g., O'Brien v. New England Tele. & Tele. Co.,
664 N.E.2d 853, 847 (Mass. 1996).
50. Only about one-fifth of states, for example, permit the use of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing to fight an at-will termination. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 43, at 536. This
doctrine varies considerably from state to state, and imposes a range of discharge requirements on
employers from articulating "good cause" to merely honoring benefits accrued by at-will employees
during their tenure. See, e.g., Teresa A. Cheek, The Employment-at-Will Doctrine in Delaware: A
Survey, 6 DEL. L. REv. 311, 351-55 (2003).
51. See McGinley, supra note 17, at 1493.
52. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 43, at 550-51 (internal citations omitted).
53. See Margaret C. Hobday, ProtectingEconomic Stability: The Washington Supreme Court
Breathes New Life in the Public-Policy Exception to At-Will Employment for Domestic Violence
Victims, 17 WM. &MARYJ. WOMEN&L. 87, 97-98 (2010).

54.
55.
56.

Prysak v. R.L. Polk Co., 483 N.W.2d 629, 634 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992)
See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 43, at 515.
See id at 515, 517-18.
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engaging in lawful off-duty conduct,5 but these, too, have been narrow
in both scope and substance. First, most of these statutes explicitly
protect only against discrimination for cigarette smoking outside of
work. 8 Second, although other statutes prohibit discharge based on the
off-duty use of "lawful products," they provide no protection with
respect to "lawful activity" more generally.59 A small handful of states
go further, providing statutory protection for off-duty lawful conduct,o
which would presumably encompass off-duty employee speech.
However, courts have narrowly construed these statutes, particularly as
they apply to the protection of off-duty speech.
While these exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine are
numerous, they provide an uneven patchwork of protection for employee
speech. In fact, because the exceptions are narrowly interpreted, they
57. As of 2008, twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia had statutes that prevent
discharge based on an employee's lawful off-duty activities. See Off-Duty Conduct, NAT'L CONF.
OF ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/labor/employee-off-duty-conduct.aspx
(last updated May 30, 2008).
58. Seventeen of these jurisdictions--Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Indiana,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oklahoma,
Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming-have enacted
"tobacco only" statutes. See id These statutes merely protect the off-duty use of cigarettes. See, e.g.,
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-40s (West 2011) (prohibiting employers from requiring, as a
condition of employment, "that any employee or prospective employee refrain from smoking or
using tobacco products outside the course of his employment . . . ."); D.C. CODE § 7-1703.03(a)
(2001) ("No person shall refuse to hire or employ any applicant for employment, or discharge or
otherwise discriminate against any employee with respect to compensation or any other term,
condition, or privilege of employment, on the basis of the use by the applicant or employee of
tobacco or tobacco products.").
59. Eight jurisdictions-Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina,
Tennessee, and Wisconsin-have adopted this approach. Off-Duty Conduct, supra note 57. These
statutes tend to make an exception for non-profit organizations that, as one of their primary
purposes or objectives, discourage the use of one or more lawful products by the general public.
See, e.g., 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 55/5 (West 2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.938 (West 2006).
60. These states include California, Colorado, New York, and North Dakota. Off-Duty
Conduct, supra note 57. By their plain terms, these are arguably the most robust of the off-duty
activity statutes. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 96(k) (West 2011) (protecting discharge from
employment for lawful conduct occurring during nonworking hours away from the employer's
premises); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §24-34-402.5 (West 2008) (providing a civil action for damages
to employees who are discharged "due to that employee's engaging in any lawful activity off the
premises of the employer during nonworking hours" unless one of two exceptions applies); see also
Robert Sprague, Invasion of the Social Networks: Blurring the Line Between PersonalLife and the
Employment Relationship, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REv. 1, 10, 23 (2011) (discussing the state statutes
prohibiting discrimination for off-duty conduct).
61. See, e.g., Marsh v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1458, 1460, 1463 (D. Colo. 1997)
(predicting, as a matter of Colorado state law, that the state's off-duty conduct statute did not protect
a Delta employee's letter to a local newspaper complaining about working conditions because the
statute's bona fide occupational requirement exception contemplates an implied duty of loyalty to
one's employer).
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provide weak protection to employees.
Employers in most
circumstances continue to have the right to fire employees based on their
speech.62
B. FederalStatutory Exceptions to the At- Will Doctrine
Federal statutory law also provides a number of exceptions to the
employment-at-will doctrine. The employment discrimination statutes
prohibit failure to hire, promote, or discharge based on an individual's
membership in a protected class.
Ordinarily, these statutes will not
affect an employer's ability to discipline based on speech, but there are
two important exceptions in the statutes. First, the anti-discrimination
statutes forbid retaliation for participating in an anti-discrimination suit
or for opposing employer practices made illegal by the statute.64 There
is no requirement limiting the employee behavior or the employer
retaliation to the workplace.65 Thus, the anti-retaliation provisions of the
anti-discrimination statutes protect employee speech on social media that
opposes an employer's discriminatory behaviors so long as the
statements are made in a good faith reasonable belief that an employer
violated the anti-discrimination statute.66
Second, the courts have interpreted the anti-discrimination statutes
to prohibit harassment based on an individual's protected
characteristics. 6 7 This interpretation actually permits some limitations
on employee speech. For example, subject to certain defenses, under
Title VII an employer will be liable for supervisor, co-worker, or
customer speech that creates a hostile work environment that alters the
62. See generally, Cynthia L. Estlund, Free Speech and Due Process in the Workplace, 71
IND. L.J. 101, 114-19 (1995) (discussing free speech protections in both the private and public
sector).
63. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)(2006) (prohibiting employment discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, and national origin).
64. See, e.g., id. § 2000e-3(a) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment . .. because he has
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under this subchapter.").
65. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 70 (2006) (holding that
application of Title VII retaliation provision is not limited to employer's employment-related or
workplace actions).
66. Cf id at 68. "In our view, a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have
found the challenged action materially adverse, which in this context means it well might have
dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination." Id (internal
quotation marks omitted).
67. See, e.g., Crowley v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 303 F.3d 387, 395, 406 (1st Cir. 2002).
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terms or conditions of employment and is based on employee's sex.6 8
Speech or behavior that rises to the level of sexual harassment or
harassment based on another characteristic protected by federal law does
not necessarily have to occur in the workplace. 6 9 Employers who know
or have constructive knowledge of harassment of an employee by coworkers or customers that occurs in social media may be liable for
sexual or gender-based harassment.70 And, if the harasser is a supervisor
within the chain of command, the employer is strictly liable unless it can
Title VII and the other antiprove an affirmative defense. 7 '
discrimination statutes, therefore, create an incentive for employers to
prohibit certain types of speech at work and on social media, and to
discipline employees who engage in this speech.72 Finally, as mentioned
in the Introduction, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations
Board has recently interpreted the NLRA to provide protection to
employees who engage in concerted protected speech on social media.
The next Part discusses this protection at length.
III. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT: PROMISING PROTECTIONS
FOR EMPLOYEE SPEECH?

In spite of Title VII's countervailing incentives for employers to
curb speech in the workplace, federal protections still hold more promise
for encouraging democracy in the workplace than their state
68. E.g., id. at 395.
69. See, e.g., id. at 409-10 (approving the consideration of behavior outside the four walls of
the workplace in the evaluation ofplaintiffs hostile working environment claim). But see Gowesky,
M.D. v. Singing River Hosp. Sys., 321 F.3d 503, 510-11 (5th Cir. 2003) (declining to consider
behavior occurring outside the workplace because "[A] harassment claim, to be cognizable, must
affect a person's working environment.").
70. See, e.g., Amira-Jabbar v. Travel Servs., Inc., 726 F. Supp. 2d 77, 85-86 (D.P.R. 2010)
(considering evidence of social media harassment as part of a hostile work environment claim, but
granting summary judgment to defendant travel agency). Cf Blakey v. Cont'1 Airlines, Inc., 751
A.2d 538, 552 (N.J. 2000) (holding that electronic bulletin board was so closely related to
workplace environment and beneficial to employer that continuation of harassment on forum should
be regarded as part of the workplace).
71. The affirmative defense is not necessary if there is a tangible employment action that
occurs as a result of the harassment. This would ordinarily not be the case in a speech case, but it
could conceivably happen. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998);
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
72. Eugene Volokh argues that some harassing speech by employers is protected by the First
Amendment and should not be circumscribed by federal law. See Eugene Volokh, Comment,
Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791, 184849 (1992); Eugene
Volokh, What Speech Does "Hostile Work Environment" HarassmentLaw Restrict?, 85 GEO. L.J.
627, 635 (1997). No courts have adopted this viewpoint.
73. See supra text accompanying note 33.
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counterparts. The NLRA protects employees against discharge or other
discipline when the claim involves conduct or speech that is protected
and "concerted activity" under Section 7.74 Section 7 grants employees,
in both union and non-union shops, the right "to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection."75 Section 8(a)(1), in turn, makes it an "unfair
labor practice" to interfere with rights granted by section 7.76
Many employers understand that the NLRA governs behavior in
private unionized workplaces, or if not unionized, workplaces that are in
the midst of a union drive." What many employers and employees may
not know is that Section 7 applies to the concerted action of all
employees, whether in unionized workplaces, or whether or not they are
engaged in a union campaign.78 The General Counsel of the National
Labor Relations Board ("GC") has recently interpreted as unfair labor
practices discharges of some employees because of statements made on
social media.
The law, according to the GC, protects speech of employees using
social media tools when it constitutes concerted activity for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.8o Thus, an
employer who discharges an employee based on speech on Facebook,
Twitter, or another social media tool will commit an unfair labor practice
if the speech itself is a concerted activity and is protected and the
employer knows of the concerted nature of the speech. 1 Moreover, as
the GC explained, an employer can violate the Act if it has certain
policies that limit or chill employee speech on the Internet, even if the
74. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
75. In its entirety, Section 7 states:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in
section [8] of this title.

Id.
76.
Section 8 declares that it is an unfair labor practice for employers "to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section [7]." Id. § 158(a)(1).
77. See id. § 158(a)(2) (employers cannot "dominate or interfere with the formation or
administration of any labor organization").
78. See Bravo v. Dolsen Cos., 888 P.2d 147, 150-51 (Wash. 1995).
79. See Am. Med. Response of Conn. Inc., Case 34-CA-12576, Advice Memorandum, at 13
(Oct. 5, 2010), availableat https://www.nlrb.gov/case/34-CA-12576 [hereinafter Am. Med. Memo].

80.

Seeidat9-10.

81.

See id
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employer is not enforcing the policies.
A. Concerted,ProtectedActivity
1. Defining "Concerted" and "Protected" in the Social Media Context
While all speech on social media could be construed as "concerted"
in the sense that the media is public and engaged in by multiple
persons, the GC has declined to do so and has considered the nature of
social media as well as previous cases under the NLRB in determining
where to draw the line between protected and non-protected speech.
Following Board precedent, the GC noted that an individual can be
engaged in concerted activity if he or she engages in the activity "'with
or on the authority of other employees, and not solely by and on behalf
of the employee himself.'" 85 The question about whether the activity is
concerted is a factual one.86 The Board will find concerted activity when
record evidence demonstrates group activities whether or not they are
"specifically authorized." 87 Moreover, individual activities that are the
"logical outgrowth of concerns expressed by the employees collectively"
are concerted under the Act.
Finally, the GC stated, "[c]oncerted
activity also includes 'circumstances where individual employees seek to
initiate or to induce or to prepare for group action' and where individual
employees bring 'truly group complaints' to management's attention."89
On the other hand, comments made "solely by and on behalf of the

82. See id. at 11. There are a number of Advice Memoranda from the General Counsel to the
Regional offices regarding social media. This is because the General Counsel has instructed all
regional offices to send all of their social media cases to the Office of the General Counsel before
filing charges against the employer. See Social Media Report, supra note 39.
83. See Jon Hyman, Is the NLRB Backing Off Its Position on Social Media as Protected,
Concerted Activity?, LEXISNEXIS LAB. & EMP. COMMENT. BLOG (Jan. 10, 2012, 3:10 AM),
http://www.lexisnexis.com/community/labor-employment-law/blogs/labor-employmentcommentary/archive/2012/01/10/is-the-nlrb-backing-off-its-position-on-social-media-as-protectedconcerted-activity.aspx?utm source=twitterfeed&utnmedium-twitter (suggesting that the NLRB
policy does not always prohibit an employer from dismissing an employee for speech on the
internet).
84. See JT's Porch Saloon & Eatery, Ltd., Case 13-CA-46689, Advice Memorandum, at 2
(July 7, 2011), availableat https://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-CA-46689 [hereinafter iT's Porch Saloon
Memo]
85. Id. (quoting Meyers Industries (Meyers II), 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 885 (1986)).
86. JT's Porch Saloon Memo, supranote 84, at 2.
87. Id. (quoting Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. at 886).
88. JT's Porch Saloon Memo, supranote 84, at 2-3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
89. Id. at 3 (quoting Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. at 887).
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employee himself' or "mere griping," are not concerted.9 o And,
comments made on the Internet, even if concerted, are not protected if
they are not linked to terms or conditions of employment.9 1
Making the distinction between concerted, protected activity and
speech that is not concerted or protected is sometimes tricky because the
analysis is heavily fact-dependent, and different people may interpret the
facts differently. 92 The GC recently asked the regional offices of the
NLRB to submit all of their social media speech cases to the GC for
advice before filing a charge. This has enabled the GC to interpret the
law and its application to particular fact patterns and to write advice
memoranda explaining the GC's analysis of the law. 94
These
memoranda function as a screen for the regional offices, and, similar to
opinions in common law, are instructive to employers and employees
who wish to assure that their behaviors are legal under the NLRA. 95
Moreover, in an effort to make the law more transparent, the GC has
periodically written reports explaining its social media advice over the
past two years.
a. No "Concerted" Activity
In a number of cases, the GC has found that employee comments
on social media were individual comments that were not protected,
concerted activity. One case dealt with a crime reporter who had
tweeted about murder victims. 9 7 His employer, the Arizona Daily Star,
found his tweets insensitive and embarrassing to the newspaper and fired
90. Wal-Mart, Case 17-CA-25030, Advice Memorandum, at 3 (Jul. 19, 2011), availableat
https://www.nlrb.gov/case/1 7-CA-46689 [hereinafter Wal-Mart Memo].
91. The Board in Amcast Automotive of Indiana, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. 836 (2006), for
example, announced that "[for an employee's activities to be protected under Section 7 of the Act,
the activity must bear some relation to employees' interests as employees." Id. at 838 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
92. See, e.g., Meyers Indus. Inc. (Meyers 1), 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 497 (1984).
93. See Social Media Report, supra note 39 ("Given the new and evolving nature of social
media cases, the Acting General Counsel has asked all regional offices to send cases which the
Regions believe to be meritorious to the agency's Division of Advice in Washington D.C., in the
interest of tracking them and devising a consistent approach.").
94. See, e.g., Memorandum from the Office of the General Counsel of the NLRB, Report of
the Acting General Counsel Concerning Social Media Cases, OM 11-74 (Aug. 18, 2011), available
at http://www.nlrb.gov/news/acting-general-counsel-releases-report-social-media-cases [hereinafter
Memorandum from the GC, 2011].
95. See id
96. See Social Media Report, supra note 39.
97. See Lee Enters., Inc., Case 28-CA-23267, Advice Memorandum, at 1 (Apr. 21, 2011),
available at https://www.nlrb.gov/case/28-CA-23267.
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the reporter. 98 The GC concluded that the reporter's behavior was
neither protected nor concerted because it did not relate to the terms or
conditions of his employment or seek to involve other employees in
employment related issues. 99
In another case, JT's Porch Saloon & Eatery, Ltd.,'o the charging
party, a bartender, had a conversation with a fellow bartender in which
he complained that the employer's policy that waitresses may not share
their tips with bartenders.10' The two agreed that the policy "sucked."I 02
A few months later, the charging party had a Facebook conversation
with his stepsister who asked him about how his night at work had
gone.10 3 "He responded with complaints that he hadn't had a raise in
five years and that he was doing the waitresses' work without tips." 04
He also referred to the employer's customers as "rednecks" and "stated
that he hoped they choked on glass as they drove home drunk." 1os He
did not discuss this posting with any other employee, nor did any other
employee respond to the posting.10 6 The employer fired the bartender,
allegedly because of the comments he made about customers.o 7 The
GC decided that the employee's posting taken as a whole was not
concerted activity because, although he discussed terms and conditions
of employment, he did not discuss the posting with a fellow employee
before or after the posting and there had been no employee meetings or
attempts to initiate group action concerning the tipping or raise
policies. 0 8 Neither the bartender nor anyone else attempted to take the
Furthermore, the bartender's online
complaints to management.'
conversation occurred in response to his stepsister's question about his
work night, a conversation that did not grow out of his isolated
complaints months earlier to his co-worker.' 10
In a third case, Martin House,"' the employer was a non-profit
98. Id. at 1, 6.
99. Id. at 6.
100. JT's Porch Saloon Memo, supranote 84.
101. Id. at 1.
102. Id
103. Id
104. Id
105. Id at 1, 2.
106. Id at 2.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 3.
109. Id.
110. Id
111. Martin House, Case 34-CA-12950, Advice Memorandum, at 1 (Jul. 19, 2011), available
at https://www.nlrb.gov/case/34-CA- 12950.
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residential facility for homeless people, many of whom had psychiatric
illnesses." 2 The charging party was fired for engaging in a discussion
on Facebook with two friends while she was at work on the overnight
shift."'3 On her Facebook wall, she made light of the patients'
psychiatric problems.1 4 The GC concluded that the speech was not
concerted or protected because the charging party did not communicate
on her Facebook account to any other employees; in fact no other
employees were "friends" on her Facebook site." 5 Moreover, she never
discussed her Facebook posts with other employees, and the posts did
not relate to her terms or conditions of employment."' 6
Finally, in Wal-Mart,'" the charging party posted comments on his
Facebook page that complained about working conditions at WalMart." 8 Certainly, the posts included criticism of terms or conditions of
employment. According to the GC, however, the posts did not
constitute concerted activity because there was no evidence that the
charging party was doing any more than expressing an "individual
gripe," and there was no suggestion that he sought to initiate group
action." 9 Moreover, only two other employees responded.120 Both
responses - one asking why he was so "wound up" and another saying
that he should "hang in there" - appeared to suggest that the employees
saw his comments as only asking for emotional support.121
In MONOC,1 2 2 the GC advised the regional office not to file a
charge even though the employer, a non-profit company comprised of
fifteen acute care hospitals, had disciplined hospital employees,
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See id.at 2.
115. Id. at 3.
116. Id.
117. Wal-Mart Memo, supra note 90.
118. The posts stated:
Wuck Falmart! I swear if this tyranny doesn't end in this store they are about to get a
wakeup call because lots are about to quit! . . . [The Assistant Manager] is being a super
mega puta! It's retarded I get chewed out cuz we got people putting stuff in the wrong
spot and then the customer wanting it for that price... . that's false advertisement if you
don't sell it for that price ... I'm talking to [Store Manager] about this shit cuz if it don't
change walmart can kiss my royal white ass!
Id at 1-2.
119. Idat*3.
120. Id
121. Idat3-4.
122. MONOC, Cases 22-CA-29008, 22-CA-29083, 22-CA-29084, 22-CA-29234, Advice
Memorandum, at 1 (May 5, 2010), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/case/22CA29008 [hereinafter
MONOC Memo].
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including the acting president of the union, for comments made on her
Facebook page during negotiations of the company's first union
contract.123 The disciplined employees included a registered nurse and
paramedic, a paramedic, and an emergency medical technician.12 4 While
Deborah Ehling, the nurse-paramedic and union acting president, clearly
used Facebook to engage in protected concerted activities,125 there were
some comments on Facebook that did not merit protection; these
unprotected comments, according to the GC, caused the hospital to
discipline Ehling and the other two employees.126 The comments,
according to the GC, raised questions concerning the type of patient care
these employees gave to the patients.1 27 Because these particular
comments were unprotected, the GC concluded, MONOC did not act
unreasonably when it disciplined the employees and reported them to the
state agency.12 8 The GC's conclusion that the employer had not
disciplined the employees for the protected speech was based on
evidence submitted by the employer of treatment of other employees in
comparable situations.1 2 9 One comparable employee who had engaged
in protected speech on MySpace a few years earlier-which criticized
the employer and supported the union campaign-was not disciplined.130
Another comparable employee, a paramedic, had posted a banner at her
work post that stated, "Be nice to Me or I May Circle the Block a Few
More Times."'31 She also left a poster in the ambulance that stated,
"Just Because It's Your Emergency Doesn't Mean It's Mine." 32
According to the employer, this employee had been disciplined more
severely than the employees in the case at hand because her derogatory
comments occurred at work. 33
123. Id. at 2-4, 8.
124. Id. at 2.
125. See id at 2 ("[Ehling] uses her Facebook page to communicate information regarding
bargaining and other Union activities and to criticize management policies.").
126. See id. at 8 ("While other postings on Ehling's Facebook page clearly involved protected
communications regarding terms and conditions of employment and ongoing labor disputes, the
specific comments cited by the Employer as the basis of the employees' suspensions did not involve
Section 7 concerns and were in no way related to the postings that did.").
127. Id.
128. See id at 9 ("[T]he evidence supports the Employer's assertion that it felt bound to report
conduct that indicated an inappropriate attitude and possibly inappropriate conduct in the
administration of patient care.").
129. See id. at 8.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 4.
132. Id.
133. See id. at 4-5. In other cases, the GC concluded that similar employee speech that
occurred on Facebook was not concerted. See, e.g., Intermountain Specialized Abuse Treatment

HeinOnline -- 30 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L. J. 93 2012

94

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 30:75

MONOC is problematic because it appears that the GC took the
employer's word that its reason for disciplining the union members,
including the acting president of the union, was for their unprotected
comments. 13 4 The case is also difficult to judge because the comments
themselves have been deleted due to Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) exemptions. 13 5 A few responses from the employer comprise the
only evidence the reader has about the employee comments. 3 6 One
employer response indicated that the employer became concerned that
the employees might withhold care if they were personally offended by
the patients.' 37 The employer also stated that the employees were
suspended due to "disparaging written comments made by you regarding
patients and patient care that were brought to our attention."l 38 A third
employer response stated that the employees' comments showed "a
disregard for patient safety and an attitude at odds with the compassion
one usually associates with the nursing profession."l 3 9 There was also,
evidently, a comment that Ehling made on her Facebook page that made
reference to the Holocaust Museum shootings.140 It appears that the
employer was justifiably concerned about these comments; in response,
it sent letters to the state Board of Nursing and the Office of Emergency
Medical Services asking for advice, and it sent the employees for
psychological testing.14 1 On the other hand, there was an ongoing battle
between the union and the employer with many unfair labor practices
asserted by both sides, which raises questions about the employer's
Center, Case 27-CA-065577, Advice Memorandum, at 3, 4-5 (Dec. 6, 2011), available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/case/27CA065577 [hereinafter Intermountain Memo] (concluding that
statements made on Facebook were not protected because they were merely an expression of a
personal gripe and did not seek to induce coworkers to engage in group action); TAW, Inc., Case
available at
2011),
(Nov. 22,
at 2-3
Advice Memorandum,
26-CA-063082,
http://www.nlrb.gov/case/26CA063082 (concluding that charging party's comment on Facebook
accusing her employer of fraud was not protected because the auditor of the company concluded
that the company's behavior was appropriate and conveyed this message to the charging party).
134. See MONOC Memo, supra note 122, at 8.
135. See id at 3. The specific FOIA exemptions invoked were (b)(6) and (b)(7)(C), which
both protect public disclosure of private information. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2006) (exempting
"personnel and medical ... and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy"); id. § 552(b)(7)(C) (exempting "records or information
compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law
enforcement records or information . . . could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy .... ).
136. See MONOC Memo, supranote 122, at 3-4.
137. Id. at 3.
138. Id. at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
139. Id.
140. See id
141. See id at 3-4.
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motive for disciplining Ehling and her colleagues.142 It seems that it
would have been more appropriate for an administrative law judge to
make the findings of fact concerning the motivation and intent of the
employer when it disciplined the employees.
b. "Concerted Activity"
In a few important recent cases the GC took the position that the
employer had discriminated against employees for engaging in
concerted, protected activities on social media. In American Medical
Response of Connecticut, Inc.,1 the charging party, Dawnmarie Souza,
an eleven-year veteran paramedic and union member, worked for a
company that provided emergency medical services in New Haven,
Connecticut.'" As a result of a citizen complaint, Souza's supervisor
asked her to write up a report.' 45 Knowing that the report might be the
first step toward disciplinary action, Souza asked to have a union
representative help her fill out the report.146 Her supervisor refused and
Souza did not completely fill out the report but wrote on the report only
that she had requested and was denied a union representative.147 Later
that day, Souza posted comments on her Facebook page concerning her
confrontation with her supervisor. 148 The comments, to which other
employees responded, included reference to her supervisor as a "dick,"
"scumbag," and a "17" (American Medical Response ("AMR") code for
psychiatric patient).149 Souza was suspended from work the following
day and terminated at the beginning of the next month.o50 The
termination letter stated that AMR had received complaints from the
emergency staff of a local hospital, and also stated that Souza had
refused to fill out the requested report, and, finally, that Souza had
posted derogatory remarks about her supervisor on Facebook.15 1
The GC concluded that AMR had violated Souza's Weingarten
rights when it refused to allow her a union representative to fill out the

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 2.
Am. Med. Memo, supra note 79, at 1.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 3.
See id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 4-5.
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incident report.152 Weingarten rights permit an employee to have a
union representative present at any investigatory interview that the
employee reasonably believes may result in discipline. 15 3 The GC
concluded that filling out an incident report was the same as an
investigatory interview for purposes of Weingarten because AMR uses
the incident report as the first step of the investigation and the reports
can lead to discipline. 154 The employer violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
National Labor Relations Act by denying Souza a union representative
to help her fill out the report and by threatening to suspend her for
failing to fill out the report without a representative. 55
Souza's
comments on Facebook, moreover, were protected, concerted activity.
According to the GC, "[i]t is well established that the protest of
supervisory actions is protected conduct under Section 7 ,"156 and it was
clear that the employer knew about the protected activity because it
referred to it in the termination letter. 1
In Karl Knauz Motors,18 the charging party was a salesman at a
BMW dealership who was terminated for comments and photos posted
on his Facebook page. 59 The comments dealt with two events. First,
the employer had held a sales event in which BMW served what the
charging party and other sales personnel believed to be inadequate food
and beverages. 60 The second event involved an accident at a Land
Rover store owned by the employer and adjacent to the BMW
dealership.161 A child had accidentally driven a new Land Rover into an
artificial pond in front of the Land Rover dealership.1 62 The GC argued
that the comments and pictures the employee posted on Facebook, in
which he criticized the employer for serving inadequate food and drink,
were protected because the employee and other employees had
complained to the employer that the sales promotion was inadequate and
they were concerned that a poorly run event would affect their sales
152. Id. at 6.
153. See NLRB v. J. Weingarten Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 267 (1975).
154. Am. Med. Memo, supra note 79, at 7 ("There is no meaningful distinction between an
employer orally asking an employee questions concerning a complaint and requiring the employee
to produce a written statement describing the events.").

155.

Id. at 8.

156. Memorandum from the GC, 2011, supra note 94, at *5.
157. See Am. Med. Memo, supra note 79, at 5,9-10.
158. Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., Case 13-CA-46452 (Sept. 28, 2011) (ALJ decision), available
at http://www.nlrb.gov/case/13ca46452.
159. Id. at 1-2, 7.
160. See id. at 3-4.
161. Id. at 3.
162. Id. at 3.
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commissions. 163 In its memorandum of August 18, 2011 the GC stated:
We concluded that the employee was engaged in concerted activity ...
when he, posted the comments and photographs regarding the sales
event on his Facebook page. As noted, before the event, several
employees were displeased with the planned food choices, and after
the meeting, the employees discussed this frustration among
themselves. At the event, the employee took photographs to document
the event and capture his coworker's frustration. He told his
coworkers that he would put the photographs on Facebook, and in
doing so, expressed the sentiment of the group. The Facebook activity
was a direct outgrowth of the earlier discussion among the salespeople
that followed the meeting with management.
Although the employee posted the photographs on Facebook and wrote
the comments himself, we concluded that this type of activity was
clearly concerted. We found that he was vocalizing the sentiments of
his coworkers and continuing the course of concerted activity that
began when the salespeople raised their concerns at the staff meeting.
Further, we concluded that this concerted activity clearly was related to
the employees' terms and conditions of employment. Since the
employees worked entirely on commission, they were concerned about
the impact the Employer's choice of refreshments would have on sales,
and therefore, their commissions.
The ALJ agreed that the Facebook postings regarding the sales
event were protected, concerted activities, but he concluded that the
employer fired the employee for the unprotected activity of posting the
Land Rover photographs rather than the comments and photos on the
BMW sales event.' 65 The GC transferred the case so that it could
continue before the National Labor Relations Board. 166 The Board
upheld the AL's decision and concluded that the speech on Facebook
concerning the sales event was protected, but also agreed that the
employee was not fired for that speech.16 7
In Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc.,168 the General Counsel
163. Memorandum from the GC, 2011, supra note 94, at *6-7.
164. Id. at *6.
165. Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., Case 13-CA-46452, at 9 (Sept. 28, 2011) (ALJ decision),
available at http://www.nlrb.gov/case/13ca46452.
166. Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., Case 13-CA-46452 (Sept. 28, 2011) (transfer order), available
at http://www.nlrb.gov/case/13ca46452.
167. Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 164, 2012 WL 4482841, at *1-2 (Sept. 28,
2012).
168. Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., Case 3-CA-27872 (Sept. 2, 2011) (ALJ decision),
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brought a charge before the NLRB.16 9 An administrative law judge
found that the charging parties had engaged in concerted protected
activity.170 In this case, the respondent, Hispanics United of Buffalo
("HUB"), is a non-profit corporation that renders social servicesincluding advocacy for domestic violence victims as well as housing and
employment-related assistance-to clients in Buffalo.17 1
The
organization fired five employees based on comments made on
Facebook.17 2 The ALJ found that an employee of HUB, Lydia CruzMoore, had criticized the work ethic of other HUB employees.17 3 She
communicated frequently with Mariana Cole-Rivera, one of five
discharged employees.174 Cruz-Moore told Cole-Rivera that she was
going to lodge her criticism with the Executive Director, Lourdes
Iglesias.175 In response, Mariana Cole-Rivera, while out of work on a
Saturday, posted a message on her Facebook page stating that Lydia
Cruz "feels that we don't help our clients enough at HUB I about had it!
My fellow coworkers how do u feel?"176 This posting resulted in posts
by the four other coworkers who were eventually fired.17 7 They include
complaints about work conditions and expectations.' 7 8 Lydia Cruzavailable at http://www.nlrb.gov/case/3ca27872.
169. Id. at 1.
170. See id. at 9.
171. Id. at 1.
172. Id. at 1,4-6.
173. Id. at 4.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See id. at 4-5.
178. Sample posts include:
By Damicela Rodriguez:
What the f. .. Try doing my job I have 5 programs
By Ludimar Rodriguez:
What the Hell, we don't have a life as is, What else can we do???
By Yaritza Campos:
Tell her to come do [my] fucking job n c if I don't do enough, this is just dum
By Carlos Ortiz de Jesus:
I think we should give our paychecks to our clients so they can "pay" the rent, also we
can take them to their Dr's appts, and served as translators (oh! We do that). Also we can
clean their houses, we can go to DSS for them and we can run all their errands and they
can spend their day in their house watching tv, and also we can go to do their grocery
shop and organized the food in their house pantries ... (insert sarcasm here now)
By Mariana Cole-Rivera:
Lol. I know! I think it is difficult for someone that [is] not at HUB 24-7 to really grasp
and understand what we do[ . . .]I will give her that. Clients will complain especially
when they ask for services we don't provide, like washer, dryers stove and refrigerators,
I'm proud to work at HUB and you are all my family and I see what you do and yes,
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Moore responded on Facebook, "Marianna stop with ur lies about me.
I'll b at HUB Tuesday[ .]"'79 In response, Mariana Cruz-Rivera posted,
"Lies? Ok. In any case Lydia, Magalie [Lomax, HUB's Business
Manager] is inviting us over to her house today after 6:00 pm and
wanted to invite you but does not have your number i'll inbox you her
phone number if you wish." 80
Lydia Cruz-Moore complained to Lourdes Iglesias, HUB's
Executive Director, about the posts.18 ' Iglesias met with five of the
employees who had posted and fired them, telling them that their posting
constituted harassment and bullying and violated HUB's anti-harassment
policy. 18 2 She also told them that Lydia Cruz-Moore had a heart attack
as a result of the Facebook postings.18 3 The ALJ concluded that the
comments the employees made on Facebook were concerted, protected
activities, and that it was irrelevant whether the employees were trying
to initiate changes in their working conditions.184 Concerted activity for
"mutual aid and protection that is motivated by a desire to maintain the
status quo" is also protected under Section 7.'8' Even assuming that it
would be necessary to prove that the employees who were ultimately
fired were trying to initiate changes in the working conditions, the ALJ
concluded that the charging parties were taking their first step toward
taking action to defend themselves from accusations about their work,
which they believed Cruz-Moore would take to management. ' The
ALJ rejected the argument that the employer fired the charging parties in
order to enforce its anti-harassment policy.' 87 He concluded that there
was no evidence that the other employees were harassing Lydia Cruz at
all, and, in particular, no evidence that they were harassing her on the
basis of any protected characteristic mentioned in HUB's antiharassment policy.'8 8 He also concluded that there was no evidence that
some things may fall thru the cracks, but we are all human:) love ya guys
Id. at 5.
179. Id at 6.
180. Id
181. Id. at 6.
182. Id.
183. Id
184. Id at 8.
185. Id
186. Id. at 8-9.
187. See id. at 10.
188. Id. at 10. HUB had a policy against sexual harassment, but also a policy against other
types of harassment that states:
Hispanics United of Buffalo will not tolerate any form of harassment, joking remarks or
other abusive conduct (including verbal, nonverbal, or physical conduct) that demeans or
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Cruz-Moore's health problems were in any way related to the Facebook
posts.189 The case was transferred to and continued before the National
Labor Relations Board, which has yet to render a decision.'90
In a memorandum dated August 18, 2011, the Acting General
Counsel of the NLRB discussed social media and how it interacts with
the National Labor Relations Act.191 This memorandum makes clear
that while much employee speech on social media is not protected under
the National Labor Relations Act, speech is protected under certain
conditions. It comments on the HUB case, explaining:
We decided that the Facebook discussion here was a textbook example
of concerted activity, even though it transpired on a social network
platform. The discussion was initiated by the one coworker in an
appeal to her coworkers for assistance. Through Facebook, she
surveyed her coworkers on the issue of job performance to prepare for
an anticipated meeting with the Executive Director, planned at the
suggestion of another employee. The resulting conversation among
coworkers about job performance and staffing level issues was
therefore concerted activity....
[T]he coworker sought input from a fellow employee about her dispute
with the advocate after the advocate indicated that they should have the
Executive Director settle their differences. The coworker had reason
to believe that the advocate's action would result in a discussion with
management about employees' responsibilities and performance and
could result in discipline. The comments of the other employees in
response to the coworker's initial Facebook posting were directly
related to criticisms of job performance and staffing/workload issues.
Thus, because the Facebook postings directly implicated terms and

shows hostility toward an individual because of his/her race, color, sex, religion, national
origin, age, disability, veteran status or other prohibited basis that creates an
intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment, unreasonably interferes with an
individual's work performance or otherwise adversely affects an individual's
employment opportunity.

Id.
189. Id.
190. See Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., Case 3-CA-27872 (Sept. 2, 2011) (transfer order),
availableat http://www.nlrb.gov/category/case-number/03-ca-027872. See also Hispanics United of
Buffalo, NAT'L LAB. REL. BOARD, http://www.nlrb.gov/category/case-number/03-ca-027872 (last
visited Dec. 7, 2012) (showing docket activity).
191. See Memorandum from the GC, 2011, supra note 94. The memo defines social media as
"various online technology tools that enable people to communicate easily via the internet to share
information and resources. These tools can encompass text, audio, video, images, podcasts, and
other multimedia communications." Id at 1.
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conditions of employment and were initiated in preparation for a
meeting with the Employer to discuss matters related to these issues,
we concluded that the Facebook conversation was concerted activity
for "mutual aid or protection" under Section 7.192
Hispanics United is an interesting case because it raises the
potential conflict between employee protected speech rights under the
NLRA and employees' rights not to be harassed based on protected
characteristics under Title VII, the ADEA, the ADA, and other antidiscrimination statutes. It also raises questions about whether employers
can rely on general anti-bullying and anti-harassment policies in the
workplace to justify firing employees for otherwise protected activities
under the NLRA. It appears in this case that the Facebook posts, if
tolerated by the employer, would not create employer liability under
Title VII or other federal anti-discrimination statutes. There is no
evidence that the behavior occurred because of any protected
characteristic of Lydia Cruz-Moore such as gender, race, age, color,
national origin, disability, or religion. Moreover, the posts seem
insufficient, absent additional evidence, to meet the "severe or
pervasive" standard established under the anti-discrimination statutes to
prove that the behavior created a hostile work environment.' 93 And, the
employer's policies in this case prohibit harassment based on protected
characteristics, but do not appear to prohibit general harassment or
bullying.194 Thus, it appears that the ALJ's conclusion is correct vis-ivis this particular policy.
But how should an ALJ decide a case like this if the Facebook
comments are more severe or pervasive and create a hostile working
environment for the victim based on a characteristic protected by the
federal civil rights laws? Under these circumstances, there would be a
direct conflict between the NLRA and Title VII, the ADEA or the
ADA.' 95 As the Supreme Court has noted, Title VII encourages
voluntary employer preventive action in order to avoid liability.19 6
192. Id. at 3.
193. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 17 (1993) (reaffirming that Title VII is
violated when the workplace is permeated with "discriminatory behavior that is sufficiently severe
or pervasive to create a discriminatorily hostile or abusive working environment").
194. See Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., Case 3-CA-27872, at 10 (Sept. 2, 2011) (AU
decision), availableat http://www.nlrb.gov/case/3ca27872.
195. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006); Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000el7 (2006); Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006); Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§
12101-12213 (2006).
196. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998).
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Particularly in the area of hostile work environments based on protected
characteristics, the Supreme Court has taken this policy very
seriously.' 97 In essence, it created an affirmative defense for employers
who create policies and procedures to prohibit, investigate, and prevent
hostile work environments and whose employees unreasonably fail to
report the harassing behavior to the employer before filing a lawsuit. 98
In doing so, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of employer
efforts to prevent discriminatory harassing behavior.' 99
It seems, then, that the Supreme Court would expect the NLRB to
consider the important policies of Title V11 200 when it determines
whether an employer may discipline an employee for speech on social
media that also potentially creates a hostile work environment based on
race, sex, gender, national origin, color, age, disability or religion.
Given the policies of Title VII, the Supreme Court would likely
conclude that social media behavior-comments, photographs, videos,
etc.-that would otherwise create a hostile work environment based on
an employee's membership in a protected class, would not be protected
activity under Section 7 of the NLRA. The GC of the NLRB has taken
the position that if the posting includes a racially discriminatory
statement that causes an uproar in the workplace, the behavior will not
be protected because of the Section 7 exceptions from protection of
201
concerted activity that is opprobrious.
But an employer's zero tolerance anti-harassment or anti-bullying
policy is another matter. Many employers create these types of policies
that go well beyond Title VII and state law.202 Often, employers seek to
control behavior before federal or state law comes into play and to create
a more comfortable place to work for all employees.2 03 These polices,
197. See id.
198. See id at 765; Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) ("When no
tangible employment action is taken, a defending employer may raise an affirmative defense ....
While proof that an employer had promulgated an antiharassment policy with complaint procedure
is not necessary in every instance ... the need for a stated policy suitable to the employment
circumstances may appropriately be addressed in any case when litigating the first element of the
defense.").
199. See id. at 805-08.
200. We refer to Title VII in this paragraph but the same arguments are applicable to the
ADEA and the ADA because both have been interpreted like Title VIl to prohibit harassment based
on an employee's protected characteristic that creates a hostile work environment that alters the
terms or conditions of employment. See Brennan v. Metro. Opera Ass'n, Inc., 192 F.3d 310, 318 (2d
Cir. 1999) (ADEA); Shaver v. Indep. Stave Co., 350 F.3d 716, 719-20 (8th Cir. 2003) (ADA).
201. See Kiewit Power Constructors Co. v. NLRB, 652 F.3d 22, 26 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
202. See, e.g., Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., Case 3-CA-27872, at 10 (Sept. 2, 2011) (ALJ
decision), availableat http://www.nlrb.gov/case/3ca27872.
203. See Kerin Stackpole, Proactive Employee Engagement with Social Media Guidelines,
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which restrict employee behavior beyond that required by federal or
state law, should yield to the NLRA Section 7 protection of concerted
activity. In fact, as discussed below, the GC has interpreted many broad
social media policies as violative of the NLRA even if they are not
enforced. 2 04 This result is not necessarily problematic because the
NLRA itself has limits and will strip concerted behavior of protection if
it is "opprobrious." 20 5 Whether the behavior is hostile toward another
employee in an egregious fashion should be a factor for the ALJ to
consider in determining whether the speech will lose its protection. The
next subpart discusses what types of behavior and speech lose their
protection as concerted activity under the National Labor Relations Act.
2. Lost Protection for Concerted Activity? Opprobrious Comments
Even concerted activity that an employer knows about may not be
protected if it is "so egregious as to remove the employee's conduct
from the protection of the Act." 2 06 In making this determination, the
Board considers four factors (known as the Atlantic Steel factors): "(1)
the place of the discussion; (2) the subject matter of the discussion; (3)
the nature of the employee's outburst; and (4) whether the outburst was,
in any way, provoked by an employer's unfair labor practice."20 7 The
GC has agreed that the Atlantic Steel test applies to speech that takes
place on social media, and that application of factors two and four is
straightforward.208 The GC also states, however, that given the context,
the test should be somewhat modified to consider not only the disruption
to the workplace discipline but also to consider the alleged
disparagement of the employer's products and services.209 In American
Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc.,210 the GC concluded that use of
SOCIAL MEDIA MONTHLY (Oct. 8, 2012), http://thesocialmediamonthly.com/proactive-employeeengagement-with-social-media-guidelines/.
204. See Memorandum from the Office of the General Counsel of the NLRB, Report of the
Acting General Counsel Concerning Social Media Cases, OM 12-59, at 3 (May 30, 2012), available
at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d4580a375cd [hereinafter Memorandum from
the GC, 2012].
205. See infra Part III.A.2.
206. Am. Med. Memo, supra note 79, at 9 (citing Atl. Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816
(1979)).
207. Atl. Steel, 245 N.L.R.B. at 816.
208. Wolters Kluwer Fin. Serv., Inc., Case 18-CA-64873, Advice Memorandum, at 4 (Nov.
28, 2011), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/case/18-CA-064873 [hereinafter Wolters Kluwer
Memo].
209. Id. at 4-5.
210. Am. Med. Memo, supra note 79, at 9. The Hartford regional office of the NLRB
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the terms "dick," "17," (AMR code for a psychiatric patient) and
"scumbag" in reference to the charging party's supervisor on her
Facebook page "was not so opprobrious as to lose the protection of the
Act." 2 11 Applying the four-factor test, the GC stated:
[W]e conclude that Souza's conduct was not so opprobrious as to lose
the protection of the Act. As to the first factor, the Facebook postings
did not interrupt the work of any employee because they occurred
outside the workplace and during the non-working time of both Souza
and her coworkers. As to the second factor, the comments were made
during an online employee discussion of supervisory action, which
is ... protected activity. Regarding the third factor, although Souza
called Filardo a "17," "dick," and "scumbag," the name-calling was

not accompanied by any verbal or physical threats, and the Board has
found more egregious name-calling protected. The fourth factor
strongly favors a finding that the conduct was protected; Souza's
Facebook postings were provoked by Filardo's unlawful refusal to
provide her with a Union representative for the completion of the
incident report and by his unlawful threat to discipline her.
Considering these factors, we conclude that Souza did not lose the
protection of the Act. 2 12
The GC noted that in other cases, the NLRB has found that calling
a supervisor a "liar and a bitch," a "fucking son of a bitch" and an
"egotistical flick" did not destroy the protection of the
communication.2 13
Moreover, the GC has concluded that activity does not lose its
protection because it is defamatory unless the statement is maliciously
false.2 14 Thus, employees who responded to a Facebook posting of a
former employee that criticized their employer's tax withholding

ultimately filed a complaint against the respondent in this case alleging that the employee was
discharged unlawfully because she was engaged in protected activity when she posted comments
about her supervisor and responded to comments from her co-workers. The case was settled, and the
company agreed to revise an overly-broad policy. See Settlement Reached in Case Involving
Discharge for Facebook Comments, NAT'L LAB. REL. BOARD (Feb. 8, 2011),
http://www.nlrb.gov/news/settlement-reached-case-involving-discharge-facebook-comments.
211. Am. Med. Memo, supra note 79, at 9.
212. Id. at 9-10 (footnotes omitted). The ALJ in Hispanics United also concluded that the
employees' statements did not lose protection of the Act and placed emphasis on the fact that the
posts were not made at work or during work hours. Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., Case 3-CA27872, at 9 (Sept. 2, 2011) (ALJ decision), availableat http://www.nlrb.gov/case/3ca27872
213. Am. Med. Memo, supra note 79, at 10, n.19 (citing Stanford N.Y., LLC, 344 N.L.R.B.
558, 558-59 (2005) and Alcoa Inc., 352 N.LR.B. 1222, 1225-26 (2008)).
214. Memorandum from the GC, 2011, supra note 94, at 10.
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practices were protected. 2 15 According to the GC, there was no valid
basis to presume that the employees' statements were defamatory, much
less malicious.2 16 Finally, the employer's threats to file a lawsuit against
the employees were unlawful activities that interfere with employees'
Section 7 rights.2 17 Because the employer did not file a lawsuit but
merely threatened to do so, the threat had no First Amendment
protection, and even if there were a reasonable basis for the potential
legal action, the threats were unlawful.2 18
The GC's analysis of the first factor favors employees who post
comments on social media so long as the employees access the social
media from their own computer or smart phone and not during working
hours.219 In most of the recent cases where the GC concluded that the
behavior or comments on social media were protected, the GC found
that the comments were not so opprobrious as to remove their
protection.220 This is in large part, it appears, because the behaviors
occurred outside of work and on systems not owned by the employer,
and there was no suggestion that the comments affected the employees'
work performance. Thus, it seems that once considered protected, the
employee comments made on social media will not ordinarily lose the
protection unless they are particularly hostile.2 2 1 But this analysis may
change depending on the audience, and on the type of comments made.
While employees often communicate via social media outside of work,
social media postings have the capability of reaching a much larger
audience and of harming the employer if its services or products are
disparaged.222 Whether the NLRB will in the future take into account
the public nature of the comments is unclear. The GC does not mention
this as a factor, but it is possible that in the future comments made on
social media such as Facebook to one's "friends" will be protected
whereas the same comments made on YouTube to a large audience
might not be. The GC seems not to have anticipated this question, but if
the comments go "viral" on the Internet, employers will likely argue that

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
Use

Id. at 7-10.
Id at 9.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., id
See, e.g., Am. Med. Memo, supranote 79, at 9.
See Memorandum from the GC, 2011, supranote 94, at 9.
See Christopher M. Leh, Reducing Employer Risk Concerning Employee Social Media
-

Disparagement,

DIGITAL

WORKPLACE

BLOG

(July

26,

http://www.digitalworkplaceblog.com/electronic-communications/reducing-employer-riskconcerning-employee-social-media-use--disparagement/.

HeinOnline -- 30 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L. J. 105 2012

2010),

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW JOURNAL

106

[Vol. 30:75

they harmed the company's reputation in a way that may have financial
effects. Moreover, given the GC's view that a modified test is
appropriate where the speech takes place on social media,223 and the
public nature of speech on social media, in the future the NLRB may
consider speech opprobrious if it is openly disparaging of the employer's
products or services or of its customers or clients.
There is at least one case where the GC concluded that the speech
on Facebook was so opprobrious as to lose its protection. In that case,
the charging party, an employee at Detroit Medical Center, posted racist
comments about his fellow workers on Facebook, which caused a
significant uproar in the workplace.22 4 As a result, the employer
suspended the charging party, and, following the suspension, placed the
charging party on probation. 225 The GC found the comments on
Facebook were not protected.226 Even though the subject matter of the
speech dealt with working conditions and ordinarily would have been
protected, the employee's use of racial stereotypes removed it from the
Act's protection. 227atd
The GC stated:
[A]lthough the subject of the Charging Party's Facebook "discussion"
implicated Section 7 concerns, the other Atlantic Steel factors weigh

against protection. The location of the discussion - on Facebook resulted in wide circulation of the Charging Party's comments among
his coworkers and weighs against protection because those comments
caused a major disruption in the workplace. The nature of his
"outburst" also weighs against protection because of his use of racial
stereotypes and slurs, following directly upon a perceived threat,
significantly increased racial tension in the workplace. Employees
were extremely upset by his comments, and several complained about
them to the Employer. Finally, his conduct was not provoked by an
unfair labor practice. In these circumstances, we conclude that on
balance, his Facebook activity lost the protection of the Act. 228
3. Employer Surveillance of Social Media
Under the NLRA, it is also unlawful for employers to engage in

223. See Wolters Kluwer Memo, supra note 208, at 4-5.
224. Detroit Med. Ctr., Case 7-CA-06682, Advice Memorandum, at 4-5 (Jan. 10, 2012),
available at http://mynIrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458084ffc5.
225. Id. at 3.

226.

Id. at 5.

227.
228.

Id.
Id. at 5.
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surveillance or give the impression that they are engaging in surveillance
of employees' Section 7 activities. 2 29 This surveillance or even an
impression of surveillance is unlawful because it discourages employees
from engaging in union activity and creates the fear that employers are
"peering over their shoulders." 230 An employer creates the impression
that it is engaging in surveillance when "the employee would reasonably
assume" from the employer's behavior and statements that the employer
is engaged in surveillance activities. 231' The Board considers employer
revelation of "specific information about a union activity that is not
generally known" without revealing its source to indicate that the
employer is creating the impression that it is engaging in surveillance of
union activities.232 But, where the employer explains that it received its
information from other employees, especially absent evidence that the
employer solicited the information, the employees cannot reasonably
conclude that the employer is engaged in surveillance of union
activities.233 Thus, it appears that the GC would not approve of an
employer whose management befriended an employee on Facebook for
the purpose of investigating comments made about the employer's
workplace. It would, however, consider an employer's action based on
comments made on Facebook appropriate if the employer received the
posts from another employee without soliciting the information, and if
the employer notified the target that the source of the information was
another employee.234
23 5
In Bridgestone Firestone South Carolina,
for example, the
manager's plant-wide letter, which thanked the "many team members
who have chosen to provide information," did not create an impression
of unlawful surveillance because it reported that employees had
voluntarily provided information to the employer.23 6 In MONOC, the
GC concluded that the employer neither engaged in surveillance nor
gave the impression that it had engaged in surveillance because it

229. MONOC Memo, supra note 122, at 9 (citing Stevens Creek Chrysler Jeep Dodge, Inc.,
353 N.L.R.B. 1294, 1296 (2009)).
230. MONOC Memo, supra note 122, at 9 (quoting Flexsteel Indus., 311 N.L.R.B. 257, 257
(1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
231. MONOC Memo, supra note 122, at 9 (quoting Flexsteel, 311 N.L.R.B. at 257) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
232. MONOC Memo, supra note 122, at 9 (quoting Flexsteel, 311 N.L.R.B. at 257).
233. See MONOC Memo, supra note 122, at 9. See also Bridgestone Firestone S.C., 350
N.L.R.B. 526, 527 (2007).
234. See MONOC Memo, supra note 122, at 10.
235. Bridgestone, 350 N.L.R.B. at 526.
236. Id. at 526-27.
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obtained Ehling's Facebook page and e-mails from other employees
without soliciting them, and told Ehling that another employee had
provided the information to MONOC.237 Moreover, the GC concluded,
Ehling knew that viewing her Facebook page was limited only to her
"friends" and therefore knew that the employer did not engage in direct
surveillance. 23 8 The letter of suspension sent to Ehling and her coworkers referenced comments "brought to" the employer's attention,
language that appears to disavow direct surveillance. 2 39 Finally,
MONOC's labor attorney told the union's attorney that other employees
had forwarded Ehling's e-mails to managers. 2 4 0 All of these
communications were sufficient to preclude the employees' reasonable
belief that the employer was engaged in surveillance. 241
B. Social Media Policies

Just a few years ago, lawyers advised employers to establish broad
social media policies to protect companies from statements and
photographs posted by employees on Facebook and other social
media.242 This advice, however, now appears questionable, given the
GC's newest reaction to social media and other polices limiting
employee speech.243 The GC has consistently advised that ambiguous
broad policies that curtail speech on social media, absent limiting
language, violate the NLRA.244 Rules, however, that "clarify and restrict
their scope by including examples of clearly illegal or unprotected
conduct" are often lawful.245 These examples are important because
work rules can violate workers' rights even if the employer does not
enforce them if they "would reasonably tend to chill employees in the
exercise of their Section 7 rights." 246 The Board uses a two-step test to
determine whether a policy fits this definition. First, it violates the
NLRA if the rule explicitly restricts the employees' Section 7 protected

237. MONOC Memo, supra note 122, at 10.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id
242. See Mark Herrmann, Inside Straight: Why Your Four-Month-Old Social Media Policy is
Obsolete, ABOVE THE L. (Oct. 31, 2011, 10:16 AM), http://abovethelaw.com/2011/10/insidestraight-why-your-four-month-old-social-media-policy-is-obsolete/.
243. See, e.g., supra Part III.A.3.
244. See Memorandum from the GC, 2012, supra note 204, at 3.
245. Id.
246. Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. 824, 825 (1998).
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activities.247 Even if it does not explicitly restrict employees' Section 7
rights, a policy is unlawful if, "[i] employees would reasonably construe
the language to prohibit Section 7 activity[, ii] the rule was promulgated
in response to union activity[,] or [iii] the rule has been applied to
restrict the exercise of Section 7 rights., 24 8
American Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc.249 is a good

example. The company had two policies that prohibited offensive
language and behavior. The Standards-of-Conduct policy prohibited
"[u]se of language or action that is inappropriate in the workplace
whether racial, sexual, or of a general offensive nature" and "[r]ude or
discourteous behavior to a client or coworker." 25 0 The Blogging and
Internet Posting Policy stated:
Employees are prohibited from posting pictures of themselves in any
media, including but not limited to the Internet, which depicts the
Company in any way, including but not limited to a Company uniform,
corporate logo or an ambulance, unless the employee receives written
approval from the EMSC Vice President of Corporate
Communications in advance of the posting;
Employees are prohibited from making disparaging, discriminatory or
defamatory comments when discussing the Company or the
employee's superiors, co-workers and/or competitors.251
The GC concluded that both of these policies violated Section 7
rights. 2 52 Even though the employer did not use the Standards-ofConduct policy to justify the discipline of Dawnmarie Souza, the GC
found that the policy was unlawful because employees would reasonably
construe the general nature of the provisions to prohibit Section 7
activity. 25 3 While such a provision may be saved if there is language
limiting the provision's scope and removing ambiguity, the employer's
Standards-of-Conduct policy here contained no limiting language.254
However, a broad "savings clause" that merely states that the employer's
247. See Sears Holdings (Roebucks), Case 18-CA-19081, Advice Memorandum, at 4 (Dec. 4,
2009), available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45802d802f [hereinafter
Sears Memo].
248. Id. (quoting Martin Luther Mem'1 Home, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. 646, 647 (2004)).
249. See Am. Med. Memo, supra note 79.
250. Id at 5.
251. Id
252. Id. at 12-14.
253. Id at 12.
254. Id
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policy will be administered in compliance with Section 7 of the NLRA is
inadequate to save the provision.255
Moreover, the GC concluded that the first provision of the
Blogging and Internet Policy violates the law because it restricts Section
7 rights and would prohibit an employee from engaging in protected
activity.256 For example, the GC noted that such a provision would
prohibit employees from posting photographs on social media of
employees carrying picket signs with the company's name or wearing a
t-shirt with the company logo while engaged in a protest against the
company.257 The second provision of the Blogging and Internet Policy,
like the provision in the Standards-of-Conduct policy, is unlawful
because it is a broad rule that prohibits protected activity and has no
limiting language.25 8
In another case, the employer's Internet/blogging policy, which
was included in the employee handbook, stated that the employer
supported a free exchange of ideas. 2 59 But it also prohibited Internet
blogging, chat room discussions, e-mail, text messages, or other forms of
communication in which an employee revealed confidential or
proprietary information about the employer or engaged in "inappropriate
discussions" about the company, management and/or coworkers. 2 60 The
GC advised that employees could reasonably interpret the portion of the
policy banning "inappropriate discussions" to ban protected Section 7
activity.261 Because this term was so broad and "would commonly apply
to protected criticism of the Employer's labor policies, treatment of
employees, and terms and conditions of employment," and because the
employer never limited or gave examples to help define the broad
terminology, the GC concluded that employees would reasonably
interpret the policy to prohibit employees from discussing terms and
conditions of employment. 26 2 Therefore, the policy was unlawful. 263
The GC also dealt with three guidelines in a social media policy of
a supermarket chain.264 The first guideline, which prohibited employees
from pressuring other employees to connect or communicate through
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

See Memorandum from the GC, 2012, supra note 204, at 8.
Am. Med. Memo, supra note 79, at 13.
Id.
Id. at 13-14.
See Memorandum from the GC, 2011, supra note 94, at 11.
Id.
Id. at 12.
Id
See id
Id. at 22.
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social media was law, according to the GC, because it could not be
interpreted to restrict protected activities.265 It merely prohibited the
specific conduct of pressuring or harassing co-workers to join them on a
social network.2 66
However, a second guideline that prohibited
employees from revealing any personal information on social media was
unduly broad and would restrict the employee Section 7 rights to discuss
terms or conditions of employment.26 7 A third guideline that prohibited
use of the employer's logo or photographs of the employer's stores was
also unlawful because it would restrain employees from engaging in
protected activity. 26 8 Like the Blogging Policy in American Medical
Response, this guideline would prevent employees from posting pictures
of employees carrying a picket sign that stated the employer's name, or
wearing t-shirts portraying the employer's logo in a protest involving
terms or conditions of employment.2 69
By contrast, the GC concluded that a similar policy by Sears was
lawful. 27 0 The policy stated that certain subjects that may not be
discussed by employees in social media include the following:

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

*

Company confidential or proprietary information

*

Confidential or proprietary information of clients, partners,
vendors, and suppliers

*

Embargoed information such as launch dates, release dates,
and pending reorganizations

*

Company intellectual property such as drawings, designs,
software, ideas and innovation

*

Disparagement of company's or competitors' products,
services, executive leadership, employees, strategy, and
businessprospects

*

Explicit sexual references

Id
Id
See id
Id.
See id.
See Sears Memo, supra note 247.
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*

Reference to illegal drugs

*

Obscenity or profanity

*

Disparagement of any race, religion, gender,
orientation, disability or national origin[.]271

[Vol. 30:75

sexual

The intent of the policy is not to restrict the flow of information but
to "minimize the risk to the Company and its associates."272 The union
began to organize a broader group of service technicians, and the
campaign used numerous forms of online media.2 73 These service
technicians were concerned about whether the "disparagement" clause
(italicized above) applied to their online discussions, but they continued
to discuss the union campaign and the relative merits of unionization
online.274 The employer did not enforce this provision of the policy
against those engaging in the online discussions, but the union filed a
charge challenging the entire policy. 27 5 The GC, however, gave advice
only as to the "disparagement" portion of the policy presumably because
the other portions of the policy are legitimate and obviously do not
restrict Section 7 rights.276 The GC concluded that given the Board's
emphasis on the context of policies, the italicized policy above could not
reasonably be interpreted to ban online discussions about terms or
conditions of employment.277 The memorandum reminded readers that
the NLRB places emphasis on a reasonable reading of the rule, which
includes a reading of the context.278 Since the policy, taken as a whole,
demonstrated that the employer did not intend to restrict Section 7
activities and the employees could not reasonably read it to do so, the
GC concluded that the complaint about the provision should be
dismissed.27 9
The GC also advised that an employer policy that included specific
examples of prohibited conduct is lawful. 2 80 This policy prohibited
"inappropriate postings that may include discriminatory remarks,
harassment and threats of violence or similar inappropriate or unlawful
271.
272.

Id. at 3 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted).
Id. at 2.

273.

See id at 1-2.

274.

Id. at 3.

275.

Id.

276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

See id. at 6-7.
See id.
See id at 5-6.
Id. at 7.
See Memorandum from the GC, 2012, supra note 204, at 19.
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conduct." 28' A courtesy policy entitled "Be Respectful" was also lawful
because it provided examples of egregious conduct so that employees
would not reasonably construe the policy to prohibit Section 7
conduct.28 2 For example, the policy advised employees to avoid
discussion online that "could be viewed as malicious, obscene,
threatening or intimidating." 283 It also prohibited "harassment or
bullying," defined as including "offensive posts meant to intentionally
harm someone's reputation," or "posts that could contribute to a hostile
work environment on the basis of race, sex, disability, religion or any
other status protected by law or company policy."2 84
IV. EMPLOYEE DISCIPLINE, SOCIAL MEDIA AND SOCIAL MEDIA
POLICIES: A PROPOSAL FOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION

The GC's advice memoranda and its reports demonstrate that the
NLRA has an important role to play in protecting employee speech in
social media, and that both employers and employees should be aware of
the extent and limitation of these protections. First, social media
provides an important medium for union organizing, and it is vital to the
union movement that unions and employees have access to these tools in
order to accomplish their goals.285 In Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB,286 the
United States Supreme Court significantly reduced the access that union
members have to employees by permitting employers to prohibit unions
from distributing pamphlets on the employer's private property in most
instances.28 7 Many scholars have argued that Lechmere unreasonably
restricted union access to employees by making it much more difficult
and expensive for unions to give information to employees. 2 88 Social
media sources can erase these disadvantages, and perhaps even improve
employee access to information that unions hope to convey during the

281.
282.
283.
284.

Id at 20 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id (internal quotation marks omitted).

285.

See LAB. PROJECT FOR WORKING FAMILIES ET AL., NEW APPROACHES TO ORGANIZING

WOMEN AND YOUNG WORKERS: SOCIAL MEDIA AND WORK FAMILY ISSUES (2010), available at
http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/workingwomen/newapproaches10.pdf.
286. 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
287. See id at 540-41.
288. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Taking State PropertyRights Out ofFederalLabor Law, 47
B.C. L. REV. 891, 907 (2006); James Gray Pope, How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike,
and Other Tales, 203 MICH. L. REv. 518, 540-41 (2004); Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of
American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527,1561-62 (2002).
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organizing process. 289
So too' should social media be available to employees in the
workplace, whether unionized or not, whether engaged in a union drive
or not, to convey information and to discuss the terms and conditions of
employment.
Generally, the GC's advice memoranda appear to
understand and respect this new reality in the workforce.290 Social
media, with certain limitations, provides a tool for organizing and
It is inexpensive and
communicating around workplace issues.
democratic.
Nonetheless, the GC advice memoranda illustrate the NLRA's
limitations in protecting employee speech. First, even though social
media itself is, in essence, a group activity, the GC did not assume that
discussion through social media was sufficient to make the activity
concerted under the statute.291 I nearly every case where the GC
recommended that there was a valid claim, there were other employees
who also engaged in the speech.292 Thus, the action apparently did not
become concerted until other employees got involved. This is not
necessary under the NLRB rules, and if it appears that the intent of the
first employee is to speak on behalf of other employees or to gather
information from other employees about their views, future cases may
find a violation if the first employee is disciplined even absent any
response by other employees. But it seems that, as a practical matter, the
regional offices will determine intent of the charging parties and may
decline to file complaints where that intent is not clear or should be a
question of fact for the administrative law judge. It seems likely that
some employee speech that should be protected under the NLRA will
not find protection.
Another limitation is the GC's willingness to interpret the facts in
the light most favorable to the employer in some cases. In Wal-Mart, for
example, the GC concluded that certain speech was not concerted but
was merely personal griping.2 93 There was no question, however, that
the employee who posted criticism of his employer on his Facebook
page was discussing the terms or conditions of employment.294 The GC,
289. See G. Micah Wissinger, Note, Informing Workers of the Right to Workplace
Representation: Reasonably Moving from the Middle of the Highway to the Information
Superhighway, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 331, 342-43 (2003).
290. See Wolters Kluwer Memo, supra note 208, at 4; Am. Med. Memo, supra note 79, at 6.
291. See Intermountain Memo, supra note 133, at 5; JT'S Porch Saloon Memo, supra note 84,
at 3.
292. See, e.g., Am. Med. Memo, supra note 79, at 3-4, 6.
293. Wal-Mart Memo, supra note 90, at 3.
294. See id. at 1-2.
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however, concluded that the employee did not intend to join in a group
action, and supported this position with the responses of the other
employers, which the GC interpreted as comfort to the employee rather
than as a discussion of terms or conditions of employment and concerted
behavior.2 95 Similarly, in MONOC, even though the employees' speech
occurred during a union drive and the first speaker on Facebook was the
union representative, the GC appears to have given more credence to the
employer's argument that it did not discipline the employees for the
speech that was protected.296
Underscoring the above limitations is that the NLRA protects
concerted, not individual action. 297 Thus, many comments made by
employees in social media will not be protected because their intent at
the time may be to let off steam, not to engage in concerted behavior.
Nonetheless, letting off steam is an important first step to concerted
activity.
Finally, the NLRA does not protect employee privacy and speech
rights that do not involve concerted, protected activity.298 Thus,
employers will still be able to discipline employees for much of their
speech on social media. To some extent, this makes sense. Employers
should have the right to punish employees who reveal trade secrets or
proprietary information, or who denigrate the employer's products
(assuming there is no whistleblower protection). 2 99 But when the speech
occurs outside of the workforce and does not detract from the
employees' performance of job duties, there is a policy question as to
whether employers' interests should outweigh those of employees.
Absent separate legislation granting employees some protection for
social media speech, the employment-at-will doctrine will likely prevail
in these cases.
On the other hand, the GC advice memoranda and reports take a
strong position with reference to social media policies. Employers
should know now that broad, general social media policies are unlawful
under the NLRA, even if employers do not enforce the policies in a way
that would intrude upon Section 7 rights.
If the policies themselves or
portions of those policies, when read in context, tend to chill employee

295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

Id at 3.
MONOC Memo, supra note 122, at 8.
See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 74, 89-91 and accompanying text.
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
See supra note 82 and accompanying text.

HeinOnline -- 30 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L. J. 115 2012

116

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 30:75

speech, those policies violate the Act. 30 1 Thus, employers should look
seriously at their general anti-harassment and anti-bullying policies
which, though well-intended, may be illegal under Section 7 if they
prohibit Section 7 concerted and protected activity or can reasonably be
interpreted to do sO. 30 2 In order to save these policies, employers should
specifically define the type of behaviors prohibited, making clear that
those behaviors do not include Section 7 protected conduct.
But interpretations of the NLRA are insufficient to protect
employees from discipline based on a large percentage of their speech
and from illegal harassment in the workplace.303 Therefore, it appears
that a new federal statute is necessary to protect individual speech rights
in social media from employer discipline and to assure at the same time
that employees receive appropriate protections from harassment under
the anti-discrimination statutes. This new statute is necessary for two
reasons. First, the NLRA speech rights may at times conflict with
employee rights to work free from harassment based on their
membership in classes protected by the anti-discrimination laws. 304 And
second, neither the NLRA nor other statutes protect employees from
employer discipline resulting from speech that does not constitute
concerted, protected speech. 3 05 This Article explains the potential
conflict between application of the NLRA and the anti-discrimination
statutes.306 The conflict may arise where speech that is otherwise
protected under Section 7 violates an employer's anti-harassment policy
created to avoid illegal harassment under the anti-discrimination
statutes.307 The Supreme Court has encouraged employers to adopt antiharassment policies by creating an affirmative defense if the employer
proves that it has a policy and the aggrieved employee has failed to
report the harassment pursuant to the policy.30 Problems can arise if the
employer disciplines an employee pursuant to its anti-harassment policy
for discussions in social media that make disparaging remarks about

301. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
302. See Lawrence E. Dub6, NLRB's Solomon Tackles Social Media Cases, Gives Wal-Mart
Policy Revision Green Light, BLOOMBERG BNA (June 4, 2012), http://www.bna.com/nlrbssolomon-tackles-n 12884909814.
303. See supra pp. 112-14.
304. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
305. See supra Part III.
306. See supra Part lI.A. 1.b.
307. See supra Part HI.A. .b.
308. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806-07 (1998).
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race, gender or other protected characteristics.30 9 It is possible that the
NLRB would find harassing speech to be protected under Section 7 even
if it includes harassing speech based on race, gender or other protected
Another possibility is that an employer's anticharacteristics.
harassment policy may be illegal under the NLRA because it tends to
chill employee speech.31 o One solution that the memoranda and reports
discussed above suggest is for the policy to state specifically what
behavior it covers and to make clear that sexually or racially harassing
speech is covered but other speech is not." Nonetheless, the tension
between the anti-discrimination statutes and the NLRA suggests that adhoc solutions are inadequate. Although the NLRA and the antidiscrimination statutes have coexisted peacefully thus far, they face
inevitable conflict. Employers may find themselves in the untenable
position of having to choose between avoiding liability under the antidiscrimination statutes and incurring liability under Section 8(a)(1) of
the NLRA by monitoring and potentially stopping employee speech on
social media.312 It is possible that speech that runs afoul of the antidiscrimination statutes could be held to violate the Atlantic Steel
factors,3 13 and therefore be removed from the protection of the NLRA.314
The NLRA and the anti-discrimination statutes, however, protect
different interests.3 1 s Moreover, although it is facially appealing to
apply a per se rule excluding harassing or discriminatory behavior from
the protection of the NLRA, such a rule might cast too broad a net,
particularly before any cognizable claim even arises. Under such a
regime, employers would still have an incentive to draft broad social
media policies in order to create an affirmative defense when litigating
Title VII discrimination claims. These policies, in turn, would likely be
Such policies may not only discourage legitimate
overinclusive.
employee speech on social media that falls short of actionable
discrimination claims, but may also dampen employee speech generally,
even when such speech is completely unrelated to discrimination claims.
Consequently, we propose a federal statute that prohibits employers
from disciplining employees for speech on social media when used
309. See supra Part III.A.1.b.
310. See supranote 246 and accompanying text.
311. See supranotes 280-84 and accompanying text.
312. See supraPart III.
313. Atl. Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816 (1979) (setting forth the four-factor test).
314. See id
315. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006) (protecting employee rights to organize, bargain
collectively), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (protecting employees from being discriminated
against on the basis of characteristics of race, gender, sex, national origin or religion).
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outside the office during non-work hours, unless the speech (i)
constitutes illegal harassment under federal anti-discrimination law; (ii)
reveals trade secrets or proprietary information; or (iii) disparages the
employer's products or services. Under the statute, employers could
assert social media policies as an affirmative defense to harassment
claims, but only when such policies are narrowly tailored (and, perhaps,
also explicitly affirm an employee's right to otherwise engage in
protected speech on social media). Though admittedly broad, the statute
would provide employees with an important safe harbor as the expansion
of the workplace continues to alter our traditional conception of society.
Indeed, as work plays a larger role in our lives and social media further
blurs the line between work and personal activity, maintaining an
effective civil society (and, in turn, an effective democracy) requires
redefining the proper bounds of the employer-employee relationship.
This statute does just that by creating a haven of protected speech for
private employees in an area that is likely to occupy an increasing share
of civil society in the coming decades. The statute would also recharacterize the employer-employee relationship established in
Lechmere316 by making it easier for unions to organize. At the same
time, the proposed statute would give employers concrete notice of what
constitutes impermissible interference with employee speech in social
media while maintaining an affirmative defense when litigating
discrimination claims.
Nonetheless, the proposed statute does raise some questions. One
concern is that such a statute may merely shift the tax on an employee's
freedom of speech to the hiring decision. If, for example, employers
cannot easily dismiss employees for unpleasant Facebook posts once the
employees are on the payroll, they might exact more scrutiny at the
front-end of the process, thereby raising the cost of doing business and
reducing the available number of jobs for such employees in the
aggregate. Moreover, the statute might encourage employers to engage
in snooping at the time of hiring. It is already clear that employers
check social media before hiring applicants to assure that nothing turns
up that is embarrassing or that would be damaging to the employer.
Equally concerning are the arguments that a statute will bring more
confusion than clarity by, among other things, conceiving a parallel
316. See supra notes 286-88 and accompanying text.
317. See Larson, supra note 29 (stating that looking at a job candidate's posts may reveal that
she is pregnant; and if she is not hired, the fact that the employer looked at the post may create
problems); Prywes, supra note 30 (stating that many employers look at job applicants' public
profiles on social media to determine their suitability for employment).
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administrative regime to enforce it, and in so doing, proliferating
complex case law about its application or, in the alternative, that it will
be too limited by its specificity. To be sure, no statute can fully predict
future developments, particularly in such a technologically-centric field,
but a statute protecting employee speech that does not otherwise
constitute illegal harassment, reveal trade secrets or proprietary
information, or disparage the company318 appears to be a workable
solution.
V. CONCLUSION

This Article notes the important changes occurring in the workplace
and in technology. It analyzes the current law protecting employees'
speech in social media, and acknowledges that there are significant gaps
in these protections, as well as potential conflicts between the NLRA
and the anti-harassment statutes when it comes to policies prohibiting
harassment or discipline of employees engaged in harassing other
employees. 3 19 These gaps, the Article argues, can be filled by a new
federal statute that protects employee rights to speech beyond that which
constitutes concerted, protected speech under the NLRA, and also
protects employee rights to work free of illegal harassment based on
race, gender and other protected characteristics, as well as employers'
rights to avoid public disparagement of their products and services by
employees.320

318.
319.

See supra text accompanying notes 19, 299.

320.

See supra PartIV.

See supra Part III.
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